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BRIEF ARTICLE
Bypassing the gatekeeper: incidental negative cues stimulate choices
with negative outcomes
Niek Strohmaiera and Harm Velingb
aDepartment of Business Studies, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands; bBehavioural Science Institute, Radboud University,
Nijmegen, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
The Theory of Event Coding (TEC) predicts that exposure to affective cues can
automatically trigger affectively congruent behaviour due to shared
representational codes. An intriguing hypothesis from this theory is that exposure
to aversive cues can automatically trigger actions that have previously been learned
to result in aversive outcomes. Previous work has indeed found such a
compatibility effect on reaction times in forced-choice tasks, but not for action
selection in free-choice tasks. Failure to observe this compatibility effect for aversive
cues in free choice tasks suggests that control processes aimed at directing
behaviour toward positive outcomes may overrule the automatic activation of
affectively congruent responses in case of aversive cues. The present study tested
whether minimising such control could cause selection of actions that have been
learned to result in aversive outcomes. Results showed incidental exposure to
aversive cues biased selection of behaviours with learned aversive outcomes over
behaviours with positive outcomes, despite a preference to execute the positive-
over the negative-outcome actions evidenced by a separate behaviour
measurement and self-reports. These results suggest motivational processes to
select actions with positive consequences may sometimes be bypassed.
Data and Materials: http://doi.org/10.17605/osf.io/ym7qu
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Throughout our lives, we learn that actions have con-
sequences. Once one has learned that certain actions
generate positive or negative outcomes, selecting and
executing actions with favourable outcomes and
avoiding actions with aversive outcomes can be
expected (Pavlov, 1927; Skinner, 1953). Recent
research, however, suggests this need not always be
the case. Building on ideomotor theory (for a compre-
hensive review of contemporary ideomotor theoris-
ing, see Shin, Proctor, & Capaldi, 2010), it has been
demonstrated that after a certain behaviour has
become associated with negative outcomes, being
presented with a negative stimulus or anticipating
negative action-effects can result in the activation
and execution of the negative outcome producing
behaviour (e.g. Beckers, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2002).
A theoretical framework that can account for this
intriguing finding is the Theory of Event Coding
(TEC; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz,
2001). TEC integrates the common coding hypothesis
of Prinz (1990) with the ideomotor principle devel-
oped by Lotze (1852) and James (1890). In short, ideo-
motor theorising suggests that actions are stored in
memory by their sensory effects, and that action plan-
ning uses the anticipation of these effects to automati-
cally retrieve the associated action. The common
coding hypothesis suggests the cognitive represen-
tations of actions and their effects share a common
representational domain (i.e. a common code).
Hence, TEC assumes that due to the representational
integration of actions and their effects, anticipating
the outcome of a certain action, or being presented
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with a stimulus that shares features with learned
action effects, will automatically activate the corre-
sponding action due to the bidirectional nature of
the action-effect associations.
How TEC can account for the processes fundamen-
tal to voluntary action has been demonstrated in an
elegant study by Elsner and Hommel (2001), in
which they put forward a two-stage model of action
control. In their experiments, people first acquire
associations between actions and effects through
repeated co-occurrences. Next, in the second stage,
people use these associations to guide goal-directed
behaviour. Specifically, in an acquisition phase (stage
1), participants could freely choose between left and
right key presses, which were followed by response-
contingent tones of low or high pitch. In a subsequent
test phase (stage 2), participants were presented with
the same tones and were instructed to press the left or
right key. Results showed that the keypresses of which
the learned effects were congruent with the presented
action-effects (i.e. tones of low or high pitch) were
selected faster (in a forced-choice task) and more fre-
quent (in a free-choice task) than incongruent key-
presses. Hence, their study demonstrated how the
integration of actions and effects into common rep-
resentational codes allows for the automatic acti-
vation of actions by presenting learned action-effects.
Although initial studies provided evidence for TEC
using non-affective action-effects (e.g. tones of high
or low pitch), Eder, Rothermund, De Houwer, and
Hommel (2015) conducted a series of experiments
that provide evidence for the idea that the principles
of TEC can be extended to affective events as well.
Just like non-affective event features (e.g. colour,
pitch, spatial orientation), affective event features are
also integrated as part of the outcome of one’s
actions and can thus be used as retrieval cues. The
authors showed that when actions and effects
become associated through repeated co-occurrences
in an acquisition-phase, presenting participants in a
subsequent test-phase with response cues (i.e. cues
towhichparticipants needed to respond) of either posi-
tive or negative valence resulted in faster responses
when the previously learned action effects matched
the valence of the response cue (see also e.g. Eder,
Dignath, Erle, & Wiemer, 2017; Hommel, Lippelt,
Gurbuz, & Pfister, 2017). Negative cues prime affectively
compatible behaviour even when the consequence is
an aversive electric shock (Beckers et al., 2002).
However, almost all experiments to date used
forced-choice tasks. Only one experiment of Eder
et al. (2015) tested whether affective response cues
elicit affectively congruent behaviour when people
are free to decide which action to perform. Based on
instrumental learning theory (Shanks, 1993), they
expected that the motivational evaluation of action
consequences should constrain ideomotor processes.
Consistent with this theory, they found participants
executed actions with positive outcomes more fre-
quently in response to positive response cues, but
they did not find such a compatibility effect for nega-
tive cues. Hence, it appears that motivational pro-
cesses suppressed the initial activation of the action
with negative consequences, preventing the selection
and execution of harmful behaviour.
We do not challenge the existence of motivational
processes operating in parallel with ideomotor pro-
cesses. However, it could still be that there are circum-
stances in which such motivational control of
behaviour might be less strong. Specifically, we
suggest that previous work investigated the hypoth-
esis while participants were put under conditions
where some control can be expected (Eder et al.,
2015), because the compatibility effects were
studied in the context of a go/no-go- task. Inhibition
of motor responses during a go/no-go task is known
to instigate controlled processing that influences sub-
sequent tasks such as gambling (proactive control; e.g.
Verbruggen, Adams, & Chambers, 2012). Moreover,
motor inhibition can suppress processing of simul-
taneously presented affective cues (so-called inhibi-
tory spillover; Berkman, Burklund, & Lieberman,
2009). It is currently unclear how this go/no-go
context exactly influenced these previous results, but
it seems plausible that control processes were sub-
stantially engaged and may have interacted with the
processing of the affective cues.
The present research aims to build upon the work
by Eder et al. (2015) and investigate whether
affective congruency effects following negative
cues can be observed when controlled processing
of the affective cues is minimised as much as poss-
ible. In our experiment the affective cues were pre-
sented incidentally during a simple task in which
participants could freely decide to press either a
left or right button. By presenting the cues during
a basic binary button press task, and by making
the affective cues completely task irrelevant, we
aimed to minimise controlled processing of these
cues. We adopted a similar two-stage experimental
design as Eder et al. (2015) and Beckers et al.
(2002), in which participants first learned affective
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consequences of their actions in an acquisition phase
and were then presented with affective cues in the
test phase. We expected that participants would be
more likely to execute the response associated with
positive outcomes when a positive stimulus was pre-
sented. More important, we also expected that when
a negative stimulus was presented, more responses
associated with negative outcomes would be exe-
cuted, relative to responses associated with positive
outcomes.
Method
Participants
55 students from Utrecht University (32 females) with
a mean age of 21.4 (SD = 2.5) were recruited and
received either course credit or a small monetary
reward in exchange. At the time of conducting this
study (late 2012), we based our sample size on pre-
vious research with similar experimental designs as
ours (e.g. Eder et al., 2015; Lavender & Hommel,
2007) and aimed to include 50 participants in our
study (we oversampled slightly in anticipation of
having to exclude several participants from analysis).
We acknowledge that this way of determining
sample sizes may be suboptimal in light of recent dis-
cussions in the literature (e.g. Anderson, Kelly, &
Maxwell, 2017). Post-hoc sensitivity analyses using
G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009)
indicated that we had a power of .80 to detect effect
sizes of dz > = .34 and a power of .95 to detect effect
sizes of dz > = .45 in one-sided dependent t-tests (i.e.
for the simple effects).
Design
A mixed 2 (response outcome: positive vs. negative) ×
2 (cue valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (response
window: short vs. long) × 2 (negative cue type:
angry vs. sad emoticon) factorial design was used,
with only negative cue type as between subjects
factor. Response window and negative cue type
were incorporated for exploratory purposes.
Apparatus, stimuli and procedure
All the stimuli were presented on a white background
using 60 Hz monitors and QWERTY keyboards.
Throughout the acquisition phase (but not in the
test phase), participants wore (over-ear) headphones
through which spoken words were presented, which
served as the affective response outcomes.
Stage 1: acquisition phase
The acquisition phase consisted of three blocks. Both
forced-choice and free-choice blocks were used in
the acquisition phase for two reasons. First, the litera-
ture is unclear with regard to which method is most
successful for acquiring action-effect associations
(e.g. Herwig, Prinz, & Waszak, 2007; Pfister, Kiesel, &
Hoffmann, 2011). Second, post-hoc we thought it
may allow us to examine whether participants prefer
actions with positive consequences over negative
consequences, which should be expected when moti-
vational processes play a role in these kinds of tasks.
In the first and the third block, (affectively neutral)
cues were presented that indicated whether a left or
right key-press was required (forced-choice blocks).
In the second block participants could freely decide
which key to press (left or right), and it was followed
by the same action-effects as in the forced choice
blocks. In the forced-choice blocks (block 1 and 3),
each trial started with a message (“Attention”) pre-
sented for 750 ms, after which a black fixation cross
(“+”) was presented for 750 ms. After the fixation
cross, a triangle (equilateral with black sides of 300
pixels) and circle (black border and diameter of 300
pixels) would be presented in a quick, alternating
fashion (for 1000 ms with each figure being shown
five times for 100 ms at a time). Directly after the alter-
nating figures, one of both figures would remain pre-
sented in the centre of the screen. This procedure was
implemented to give the impression that the cues
were presented randomly, and to ensure that partici-
pants closely attended to the screen. The figure
would serve as the response cue and indicate which
response was required. Participants were told to
press the “z” key with their left index finger when
the triangle remained on the screen or the “/” key
with their right index finger when the circle remained
on the screen (counterbalanced across participants).
The response cue was presented for 750 ms or until
the correct key was pressed.
Participants were instructed that in case of a
response, an affectively laden word would be heard
through the headphones while simultaneously the
border of the response cue would thicken to signal
the correct key was pressed. After 1350 ms, a blank
screen was presented for 1000 ms after which the
next trial would start. The spoken words were
adopted from a list with affective ratings for Dutch
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words (Hermans & De Houwer, 1994) and consisted of
20 clearly positive (e.g. love, friend, sunshine) and 20
clearly negative (e.g. fear, heartless, murder) words
(10 nouns and 10 adjectives each). In case of an incor-
rect response or response omission, an error message
was shown repeating the required action for both
cues. After 750 ms, respondents could press either
key (i.e. “z” or “/”) to continue to the next trial. Erro-
neous trials were not repeated.
In the free-choice block (block 2) each trial would
again start with the “Attention” message and fixation
cross, after which a green bar (width: 1000 pixels,
height: 50 pixels) would progressively fill-up at the
bottom of the screen in 400 ms. Participants were
asked to use this time to decide which key they
wanted to press, and to only press that key once a
response cue was presented. The response cue was
a rectangle (colour: cyan) of 256 pixels wide and 192
pixels high containing an exclamation mark with
font Calibri (bold) and size 46 in the middle. Partici-
pants were asked to not respond according to a
specific pattern but to instead respond as randomly
as possible, as if each time they mentally flipped a
coin to determine which key to press. After partici-
pants pressed either key (“z” or “/”), a blank screen
was shown for 1350 ms while an affectively laden
word was presented through the headphones. In
case of an incorrect response (omission or key other
than “z” or “/”), the instructions were repeated. For a
visual presentation of the trial sequences in the acqui-
sition phase, please see Figure 1. The forced-choice
blocks consisted of 48 trials and the free-choice
block of 32 trials with 10 practice trials, resulting in a
total of 128 trials (excluding practice trials).
Self-reported measures of action valence. Before
continuing to the test phase, participants were asked
to indicate on a 7-point scale how pleasant they
experienced it to be (1) to choose to press the “z”
key with their left index finger, (2) to choose to press
the “/” key with their right index finger, (3) to press
the “z” key with their left index finger, and (4) to
press the “/” key with their right index finger. These
questions served as a subjective measure of response
preference by checking whether keypresses con-
ditioned to be positive were also rated as more posi-
tive, and, indirectly, to check whether the action-
effect contingencies were successfully formed (see
Section 1 of the Supplementary Materials for details).
Stage 2: test phase
Participants were informed there were going to be
trials in which they had little time to decide which
key to press and trials in which they had plenty of
time to decide. Each trial would again start with the
“Attention” message (1000 ms) followed by the
fixation cross (750 ms). In the short trials, a positive
or negative emoticon (i.e. the affective cue) was pre-
sented above a green bar that was progressively
filling up in 400 ms. During this time, participants
could not respond and were instead instructed to
use this brief moment to decide which key they
were going to press. Only after the 400 ms a grey
border would surround the emoticon for 1000 ms
(50 pixels around each side) indicating participants
could press either the “z” or “/” key. Participants
were again instructed to not respond according to a
fixed pattern, but rather to respond as randomly as
possible, as if each time they mentally flipped a coin
to determine which key to press. The positive emoti-
con was a yellow smiling face and the negative emo-
ticon was either a sad or an angry looking face
(counterbalanced across participants). The emoticons
were 250 pixels wide and 250 pixels high.
In the long trials, the fixation cross was followed by
a positive or negative emoticon above an already filled
up blue bar. The emoticon and bar had the same
dimensions as in the short trial. The emoticon and
blue bar were presented for 7000 ms, or until the “z”
or “/” key was pressed. If no key was pressed after
7000 ms, a countdown would start, indicating partici-
pants had only 3 seconds left to press either key. Once
either key was pressed, or if after 10.000 ms (initial
7000 ms plus the 3000 ms countdown) no response
was given, the trial would proceed. No error
message was shown in case of an incorrect response
(omission or key press other than “z” or “/”), nor
were there any response outcomes (i.e. affective
spoken words) presented in either the short or long
trials of the test phase.
A secondary task was given to check whether par-
ticipants were attending to the screen during the task.
At the end of each trial, an arrow of 200 pixels wide
and 200 pixels high pointing either left or right was
shown. Participants were asked to indicate the direc-
tion of the arrow (press the left key (“z”) when the
arrow pointed left or the right key (“/”) when the
arrow pointed right). The arrows were presented for
1500 ms or until the left or right key was pressed. In
case of a correct response, a green border (50 pixels
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around each side) surrounded the arrow as a means of
positive feedback. No feedback was given in case of an
incorrect response. The next trial would start after a
blank screen was presented for 1000 ms. For a visual
presentation of the trial sequences in the test phase,
please see Figure 1. Participants worked through 10
practice trials and 96 test trials.
Exit questions
At the end, participants were questioned on several
aspects of the experiment. Most importantly, partici-
pants rated the emoticons that were used on several
dimensions (i.e. positive, negative, angry, sad, happy)
on a 7-point scale (the order was counterbalanced).
Please see Section 2 of the Supplementary Materials
for a complete overview of the post-test phase ques-
tions and the results.
Results
Exclusions
Inspection of individual performance data (see details
in Section 3 of the Supplementary Materials) resulted
in the exclusion of 11 participants. A final sample of
44 participants remained for analyses. Similar effects
in terms of statistical significance and direction were
found when the complete sample was analysed.
Trials with response omissions were excluded from
analyses (1.42% of all trials in the acquisition phase;
4.9% of all trials in the test phase).
Acquisition phase
A paired-samples t-test showed that in the free-choice
block of the acquisition phase, keypresses with posi-
tive outcomes were performed more often (54.4%)
than keypresses with negative outcomes, t(43) =
2.23, p = .03, d = .67, 95% CI [.07, 1.28], meaning that
in the absence of affective cues, motivational pro-
cesses directed action selection towards actions with
positive outcomes. Analyses of the subjective
measures of the action-effect contingencies (see
Section 4 of the Supplementary Materials available
online) indicated that participants preferred pressing
the key that was conditioned to be positive. Hence,
both behavioural and self-report data indicate that,
in the absence of affective cues, participants preferred
to perform the action associated with positive
outcomes.
Test phase
Although the angry emoticon was rated as more nega-
tive (M = 5.41, SD = 1.87) than the sad emotion (M =
4.41, SD = 1.62), this effect was only marginally signifi-
cant, F(1,42) = 3.59, p = .07, h2p = .08, 90% CI [.00, 22],
and this factor did not interact with the results
Figure 1. Acquisition and test phase trial sequence.
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reported below.1 The data were therefore collapsed
over this factor. A within-subjects ANOVA was con-
ducted with response outcome, cue valence and
response window as factors. The two-way interaction
between response outcome and cue valence was sig-
nificant, F(1,43) = 21.24, p < .001, h2p = .33, 90% CI [.14,
.48]. The three-way interaction did not reach signifi-
cance, F(1,43) = 3.55, p = .07, h2p = .08, 90% CI [.00,
.22]. However, since the three-away interaction did
approach significance and the effect size suggests
this might be a meaningful effect, we conducted sep-
arate analyses for the interaction between response
outcome and cue valence for both the short and
long trials. Results indicated that the interaction was
significant for both the short trails, F(1,43) = 22.29, p
< .001, h2p = .34, 90% CI [.15, .49], and the long trials,
F(1,43) = 16.68, p < .001, h2p = .28, 90% CI [.10, .43],
only the effect size was slightly larger in the former.
The simple main effects also demonstrated similar pat-
terns for both trial types. Hence, the data were col-
lapsed over this factor for subsequent analyses.
Simple effect analyses of the two-way interaction
showed that in response to a positive cue, participants
preferred to perform the action that was associated
with positive outcomes (61.2%) relative to the action
with negative outcomes, F(1,43) = 10.37, p = .002, h2
= .19, 90% CI [.05, .35]. More importantly, when a nega-
tive cue was presented, more actions with a negative
outcome were executed (59.9%) than actions with a
positive outcome, F(1,43) = 7.36, p = .010, h2 = .15,
90% CI [.02, .30]. No evidence for an incentive function
was found in the test phase as there was no bias
towards responses with a positive outcome (F < 1;
see Figure 2). We conducted additional Bayesian ana-
lyses to supplement the frequentist statistics (see
Section 5 of the Supplementary Materials), which led
to the same conclusions.
Discussion
The present study found that after the successful for-
mation of action-effect associations, subsequent
affective cues biased action-selection towards affec-
tively compatible responses. Importantly, despite par-
ticipants’ preference for positive actions, incidentally
presented negative cues still elicited a preference for
actions with learned aversive consequences. Hence,
it seems that motivational processes geared towards
directing behaviour in the direction of functional out-
comes were bypassed once incidental affective cues
were presented. The present study is the first to
demonstrate that aversive stimuli can bias action
selection towards behaviour with aversive outcomes
when people are free to decide which action to
perform. We believe previous experiments (Eder
et al., 2015) failed to demonstrate such a full
affective compatibility effect in free-choice tasks
because in these experiments participants were in a
state of moderate cognitive control, as a Go-NoGo
task was used to assess action selection.
Even though our study suggests that negative
stimuli can trigger behaviours with previously
learned negative effects when cognitive control is
minimised, we cannot rule out that participants still
executed some degree of control during the task.
Therefore, we speculate whether we can also explain
the current findings when we assume cognitive
control was not lower compared to the Eder et al.
(2015) study. The occurrence of affective compatibility
effects depends on (1) the successful integration of
actions and their effects into shared representational
codes and (2) the successful retrieval of the action
from memory when action effects are anticipated or
primed. Hence, the fact that the present experiment
did find a full affective compatibility effect can
Figure 2. Probability of executing actions per condition. Thick black
lines indicate the means and the standard errors per condition. Thin
green lines show mean responses of participants (N = 20) who
responded in line with the TEC hypothesis (C+R+ > C+R− and C−R
+ < C−R−). Thin orange lines (N = 9) show mean responses of partici-
pants who preferred performing actions with positive outcomes (C+R
+ > C+R− and C−R+ > C−R−). Thin grey lines show mean responses
of the remaining participants (N = 15). See online version of this Figure
for the colour version. C+ = positive cue. C− = negative cue. R+ =
response with learned positive outcome. R− = response with
learned negative outcome.
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possibly be accounted for by (1) a stronger formation
of the action-effect associations and/or (2) a more
potent retrieval of the action from memory upon
cue presentation. Arguments can be put forward for
both.
Regarding the formation of action-effect associ-
ations, using salient auditory stimuli as action effects
might have resulted in the formation of stronger
response-outcome associations compared to less
salient visual action effects as in Eder et al. (2015)
study. Based on research that demonstrated that
salient action-effects are more easily integrated with
the action’s representation and are therefore more
resilient to extinction (e.g. Hommel, 1996), it could
be that using auditory action effects results in stronger
response-outcome associations. Second, the absence
a full affective congruency effect in Eder et al.’s work
(2015) can possibly be accounted for by less proces-
sing of the valence of response cues, because partici-
pants responded to non-affective dimension of the
cues (e.g. they classified whether the cues represented
animals or people), compared to when cues are inci-
dentally presented as in our study (see also Lavender
& Hommel, 2007).
A separate issue concerns the possibility that the
results were influenced by demand characteristics,
meaning participants were aware of both the action-
effect contingencies and our hypothesis regarding
affective compatibility, and because of this acted in
line with our expectations. However, we do not con-
sider this scenario to be very likely. Results showed
incidental exposure to aversive cues biased selection
of behaviours with learned aversive outcomes over
behaviours with positive outcomes, despite a prefer-
ence to execute the positive- over the negative-
outcome actions evidenced by a separate behaviour
measurement and self-reports. Nonetheless, future
research would benefit from measuring awareness of
both the action-effect contingencies and the study
hypotheses. Eder et al. (2015) did measure contin-
gency awareness and found their results were not
dependent on awareness of the action-effect
associations.
The most common pattern in the data was pre-
dicted by TEC. Nonetheless, more than half of the par-
ticipants showed some other pattern. For instance,
nine participants preferred executing actions with
positive outcomes irrespective of the valence of the
cues. Future work is needed to examine whether
these individual differences are meaningful or are,
for instance, the result of decision noise.
To summarise, the present study demonstrated
that incidental perception of negative stimuli can
bias response selection towards previously learned
aversive behaviour in a free-choice setting. We
hypothesise this finding is due to participants in our
study not being in a state of heightened cognitive
control, causing motivational processes aimed at
directing behaviour towards more functional out-
comes to be bypassed. However, before we can defini-
tively attribute the findings to the level of cognitive
control, additional research should investigate (1)
the role of different types of action effects in the for-
mation of response-outcome associations, and (2)
the importance of directing one’s attention to the
affective content of a response cue for the successful
retrieval of the associated action from memory.
Note
1. The four-way interaction nor the three-way interaction
were significant when the full design was analysed (Fs
< 1).
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